

# THE SUN, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1882.



MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1882.

## Announcements To-Day.

Bethel Theatre—The Comedy Boys.  
Bijou Theatre—Patent  
Brooklyn Park Theatra—Romeo and Juliet.  
Belgian Panorama—Victor and Mary.  
Bonnet's Museum—Brooklyn and Sixth.  
Daly's Theatre—Mascot.  
Erica's—The Troubadour—Times of Normandy.  
Grand Opera House—The World.  
Haverty's Little Theatre—Regal's Mystery.  
Metropolitan Museum—Brooklyn and 48th St.  
Madison Square Theatre—Gondola.  
Metropolitan Opera House—Times of London.  
Shubert's Garden—A Girl's Secret Sacrifice.  
Society Theatre—Brooklyn—Duke's Cabin.  
Park Theatre—Pantomime.  
San Francisco—Minstrels—Brooklyn and 20th St.  
Standard Theatre—Mysteries—Times.  
Theatre Comique—The French Cook.  
Tours' Pastoral Theatre—Daisy Juntas.  
Union Square Theatre—Theatricals.  
Windor Theatre—Switzerland.  
Woolstock Theatre—Tales from 1876.

## Advertising Rates.

DAILY AND SEMI-DAILY, to carry a line, ordinary advertising, for large space, so costly, and inferior positions, 50 cents to \$2.50, according to classification.

WEARLY 50 cents a line, no extra charge for large type. Preferred positions from 75 cents to \$2.

The regular circulation of THE SUN for the week ending Sept. 23, 1882, was:

Sunday	1,52,24	Thursday	148,064
Tuesday	142,924	Friday	142,064
Wednesday	141,122	Saturday	142,064
Total	1,418,324	Weekly	64,028
Total for the week.		1,098,449	

## Advice to Aspirants.

The business of president making has not yet regularly begun, and we would offer a few suggestions beforehand in order to simplify and facilitate the work when it becomes necessary to enter upon it in earnest.

If any man wants to be President who happens to be a citizen of a small State, let him move out and become a citizen of some big State. The small States are of no account in selecting candidates for President. It is true that we might imagine a man of such extraordinary genius, such superior abilities, and such an enviable character that he might be taken up and nominated, even if he came from so small a State as Rhode Island or Florida; but this is a case that is not likely to arise. In these days men of astonishing greatness are rarely encountered. Where the whole people are educated and evolved to such a point that almost every citizen would make a tolerably good President, there is little likelihood that any one among them will tower above all the rest to such a height as the extraordinary man whom we have imagined. The hypothesis then may be safely put out of view, and we may stand on the rule that no citizen of a small State, no matter how distinguished, can reasonably expect to be nominated for President by either party.

Neither is it likely that a citizen of any State which is certain for either party will be nominated. For instance, Massachusetts is tolerably sure to be Republican, just as Kentucky is sure to be Democratic. What advantage, then, would the Republicans gain by taking their candidate for President from Massachusetts, or the Democrats by taking theirs from Kentucky? No advantage whatever, other things being equal. They could not add anything to their probable strength in the electoral colleges. Like the small States, the certain States may thus safely be omitted from the reckoning; and each party may be expected to select its candidate not only from one of the big States, but also from one of the doubtful and closely contested States.

The probability, then, is that the candidates for President will be taken from New York, Ohio, Indiana, or Pennsylvania, provided that in either of these great Commonwealths a Republican or a Democrat can be found whose personal standing and popularity offer a rational expectation of his carrying the State he lives in for the party which nominates him. We mean Pennsylvania in this list, although it has hitherto stood certainly on the Republican side, because it is a safe estimate that the election of November will change this situation, and throw the Keystone State into the doubtful category.

Some allusion may also be made for the possibility that a particularly available man might change any one of the great certain States. If he should be put in nomination, however, he elsewhere, might suffice to secure his nomination by the Democrats. In the same way, if there were in Kentucky a Republican of sufficient magnitude and influence to offer a reasonable hope of transforming the big Democratic majority of that State into a Republican majority, that fact might lead to his nomination by the Republican National Convention; but, generally speaking, this kind of possibility looks to something that is not likely to happen, and it may safely be omitted from any political prophet's calculations.

This leads us to advise every statesman who thinks he ought to be President, to emigrate not merely from a small State into a big one, but also to emigrate from a certain State into a doubtful one—that is to say, from Vermont, New Hampshire, Michigan, or Iowa, into New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, or Indiana. Unfortunately, however, such a migration is impracticable in the short time that remains between now and the election of next year, and it can only be undertaken with a view to more remote elections. For 1884 the views of politicians of both parties must be confined to the stock of availabilities already on hand in the four great and doubtful States that we have mentioned.

## Shall the Nation Pay Mr. Blaine's Taxes?

The report of a long conversation with the Hon. JAMES G. BLAINE was printed the other day by the *Chicago Tribune*. In the course of the interview Mr. BLAINE took the Virginia debt question, and we find his ideas on the subject indicated in the following extractive passage:

"What do you think will be the end of it all?" inquired the reporter.

"We are not in a position to say what the end of it all will be," replied Mr. BLAINE.

"Another consideration would weight considerably with me, and that is the fact of Virginia's reason for the loan. We were at war with Mexico, and demanded her territory; we needed her alliance, and many millions of dollars; and I think we should be fairly just and generous to one of our own states in returning her territories."

"Would not the stroke the country so hard if we did not take the world, not impeach the president, and pay Mr. Blaine?" Another consideration would weight considerably with me, and that is the fact of Virginia's reason for the loan. We were at war with Mexico, and demanded her territory; we needed her alliance, and many millions of dollars; and I think we should be fairly just and generous to one of our own states in returning her territories."

"If Mr. BLAINE's words mean anything, they

mean that he is in favor of taking money out of the United States Treasury for the payment of the Virginia State debt.

The citizens of Virginia, as everybody knows, are sharply divided in opinion about the settlement of their obligations. Some of them hold that they ought to pay the debt and maintain the credit of the State at any sacrifice; others are clamoring for repudiation, in whole or in part. But Mr. BLAINE's bold and original intellect supplies an altogether novel solution of the difficulty. The debt need neither be paid by Virginia nor repudiated by Virginia. "We can afford," says Mr. BLAINE, "to be generous to one of our own States." A few millions taken from the United States Treasury and applied to the Virginia debt would be, he thinks, "the veriest task for the Government to concede."

The idea has one very interesting aspect, which may not have been contemplated by Mr. BLAINE.

It is currently reported that within a few months past Mr. BLAINE has acquired a large interest in landed and other property in the State of Virginia. If the debt of that State is paid by the taxpayers of the State, Mr. BLAINE's property there will have to be assessed heavily for the purpose. But if the United States should assume the debt, Mr. BLAINE's taxes, or considerable part of them, would be paid for him out of the national Treasury.

We trust, however, that no merely personal and pecuniary consideration of this sort will deter Mr. BLAINE from giving to his new plan the benefit of all his eloquence.

## England's Relation to Egypt.

Now that the last stroke has been given to the conquest of Egypt by the occupation of Damietta, the work of the diplomats will begin, and the several questions involved in the Egyptian complication will call for prompt solution. There is a bondholder question, there is the canal question, and there is the question of the Khedive's relationship to his suzerain the Sultan. How far all the conditions of the problem presented by the Nubian had been modified by recent events will be apparent on a review of the circumstances under which Great Britain entered on her campaign in Egypt, and those under which she has brought it to a speedy and triumphant conclusion. The conference seems to have been convinced that the attention was paid to her wishes, either in or out of the conference, and we may be certain that no attention whatever will be paid to them now that her quondam ally has singly accomplished the whole work in which she was bound to share. For the first time in many centuries, France is a cipher as regards the solution of an Eastern problem of international importance.

The self-effacement of France, however, emboldened Turkey to interpose an obstacle to the independent action of England, whether the same should be ratified or not by the conference of the powers. She declared that the landing of a British force on the territory of her vassal would be tantamount to an invasion of Ottoman soil, and she insisted that the conference itself had no right to sanction such a proceeding until the Sultan's intervention had been requested and refused.

In this state of affairs we went to the self-effacement of France, however, emboldened Turkey to interpose an obstacle to the independent action of England, whether the same should be ratified or not by the conference of the powers. She declared that the landing of a British force on the territory of her vassal would be tantamount to an invasion of Ottoman soil, and she insisted that the conference itself had no right to sanction such a proceeding until the Sultan's intervention had been requested and refused.

At the outset of these troubles there was no cause for alarm. No apprehension of damage to that artery of commerce had been expressed in any quarter, and England's relation to the waterway was simply that of a chief customer; for, although holding a large amount of stock, she may be said to have had virtually no voice at all in the management of the company. All the matters discussed by European diplomats before the meeting of the Constantinople conference were connected with a different inquiry, viz., What duties to the Khedive had England and France assumed in return for certain privileges of fiscal control conferred on them, and to what lengths would those powers go in pursuance of their obligations? This inquiry was interwoven with another, viz., Had England and France the right to undertake military intervention in the first instance without previously denouncing the interference of the Khedive's feudal superior, ABDUL HAMID? The latter, it was pointed out, had sanctioned the contract by which his vassal had given France and England the control of his finances. He was therefore in the position of an endorser of a note, and it was claimed that recourse must be had to him before the limited parties could resort to a process of collection on their own account.

Such was the diplomatic situation resulting from the crisis brought about at Cairo by the action of the Chamber of Notables. That body, it will be remembered, acting under the influence of ABDU PASHA, and the so-called National party, insisted upon including among their functions the management of the public revenue—a proceeding incompatible with the concessions made to the English and French Controllers-General. In the face of such a reparation of the Khedive's obligations, the English and French Governments were called upon to decide on all whether they considered it worth while to enforce the contract. There was something to be said on both sides of this question, but it was clear that whatever course should be preferred must be finally carried out under penalty of exposing the loyal Khedive to the gravest peril, and of significantly impairing the influence of his faithless allies in the Levant. It was open to both France and England to decline to ratify her bombardment of Alexandria, or the military expedition which straightway followed the naval demonstration, although such ratification was the express purpose for which the conference was called. When the mandate of the powers was given, not to England, but to Turkey, the British Government paid not the slightest deference to their action, but proceeded to push the execution of their plans in Egypt precisely as if no conference had ever been convened. Nothing, in short, could exhibit a more impressive contrast to the submission of the Egyptian to the authority of his foreign overlords, like Turkey or Spain?

Had France refused from the outset to hold the Khedive to his agreement, on the ground that she would not levy war on behalf of bondholders, and thus repeat the experience of the Mexican expedition, she would have occupied an impossible position. There were many English Liberals who thought that precisely this ground should be taken by Mr. GLADSTONE, but they were met by assertions which were to have been well founded that the British Government were bound to sustain the Khedive, whose interests were inseparably connected with those of his vassals, and who it unsupported by his foreign allies, would inevitably be dethrown by his disaffected subjects. But the consideration which undoubtedly had most weight with the British Foreign Office, though it was not put forward in the early stages of the imbroglio, was the conviction that the security of the Suez Canal would be seriously imperiled by the triumph of the Egyptian National party. Lord GRANVILLE did not believe—and events have justified his incredulity—that the movement started by ABDU PASHA represented any genuine aspirations or necessities of the Egyptian people, and that there was any prospect of a lawful and orderly regime growing out of it. He believed it to be an attempt of military chiefs and corrupt functionaries to regain their old opportunities of milking the taxpayers, and he foresaw that in the quarrels which the rebels were successful, would break out between them, the interests of British commerce and the very existence of the continental waterway would be put in jeopardy.

But whatever justification might have been found for a contrary course, both France and England determined to protect the bondholders, to insist on the maintenance of the French and English control over the Egyptian finances, and to support the Khedive against his Ministers, who were acting in concert with the Notables. Their representatives ac-

cordingly delivered an ultimatum to the refractory Ministers, calling upon them to banish ABDU PASHA, who was justly regarded as the chief promoter of the existing difficulties. From the moment that this ultimatum was delivered and disregarded, a demonstration of force on the part of its authors became indispensable, unless they were disposed to forfeit all title to respect in Egypt and throughout the East. The necessity was fully comprehended by the British Foreign Office, and seems to have been at first appreciated by the French Cabinet; for French as well as English war vessels were included in the squadron which appeared off Alexandria. This demonstration failing to produce the effect expected, it became manifest that an actual collision must take place sooner or later; but at this point France exhibited a reluctance to finish the work she had begun, and carry on the line of action to which the joint ultimatum had committed her. Then it was that, at the suggestion of France, the settlement of the Egyptian troubles was referred to a conference of the great powers, and this unwillingness to assume responsibilities which unquestionably belonged to her, followed as it was by the refusal of the Chamber of Deputies to sanction under any circumstances any expenditure for the coercion of the Egyptian National party, may be said to have totally eliminated France from among the factors of the Egyptian problem. Thenceforward not the least attention was paid to her wishes, either in or out of the conference, and we may be certain that no attention whatever will be paid to them now that her quondam ally has singly accomplished the whole work in which she was bound to share. For the first time in many centuries, France is a cipher as regards the solution of an Eastern problem of international importance.

When Judge POLAND's blue coat was less threadbare, and its brass buttons shinier than now, he was elected to the Forty-fifth Congress by a majority of 756 in a vote of about 25,000.

When Judge POLAND's blue coat was less

threadbare, and its brass buttons shinier than now, he was elected to the Forty-fifth Congress by a majority of 756 in a vote of about 25,000.

When Judge POLAND went to the Forty-first Con-

gress by a majority of 19,235 in a vote of 5,005 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons reappeared in the Forty-

second Congress with a majority of 7,273 in a vote of 16,695.

The same old garment was elected to the Forty-

third Congress by a majority of 5,005 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons disappeared in the Forty-

fourth Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons reappeared in the Forty-

fifth Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons disappeared in the Forty-

sixth Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons reappeared in the Forty-

seventh Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons disappeared in the Forty-

eighth Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons reappeared in the Forty-

ninth Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons disappeared in the Forty-

tenth Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons reappeared in the Forty-

eleventh Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons disappeared in the Forty-

twelfth Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons reappeared in the Forty-

thirteenth Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons disappeared in the Forty-

fourth Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons reappeared in the Forty-

fifth Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons disappeared in the Forty-

sixth Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons reappeared in the Forty-

seventh Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons disappeared in the Forty-

eighth Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons reappeared in the Forty-

ninth Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons disappeared in the Forty-

tenth Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons reappeared in the Forty-

eleventh Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons disappeared in the Forty-

twelfth Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons reappeared in the Forty-

thirteenth Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons disappeared in the Forty-

fourth Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons reappeared in the Forty-

fifth Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

The brass buttons disappeared in the Forty-

sixth Congress by a majority of 16,445 in a vote of 16,445.

&lt;p